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Kayula James 1

The plaintiff was appointed Chief Executive Officer of Zambia Railways by the late President,
Michael Chilufya Sata, and subsequently his appointment was adopted by Zambia Railways
when a contract of employment, dated 11th January 2013, was executed between the plaintiff
and Zambia Railways. The contract was to run for a period of five years. One of the terms in
the contract of employment provided: “In the event of premature termination of the contract by
the company on grounds other than disciplinary, the employee shall be entitled to full payment
of the amount due to him for the remaining part of the five-year contract.”
By a letter dated 22nd April 2013, under the name and hand of the President of Zambia, the
plaintiff was suspended from duty and placed on half salary, purportedly to facilitate
investigations by the Anti-Corruption Commission. The suspension was in contravention of
the Zambia Railways General Staff Regulation and Disciplinary Code and Procedure.
By another letter dated 7th June 2013, also under the hand of the President of Zambia, the
plaintiff was purportedly retired in the public interest without reference to, and in total
disregard of, the conditions as stipulated in his contract of employment. At the time of the
termination, the plaintiff had only served 7 months on the five-year contract he had entered
into with Zambia Railways.
As a consequence, the plaintiff instituted an action against Zambia Railways (1st Defendant)
and the Attorney General (2nd Defendant). The plaintiff sought inter alia the declaration of the
termination of his employment as unlawful and an award of damages. The Court found that the
termination of employment was unlawful and awarded damages in form of gratuity, as well as
salaries and other benefits as though the contract ran its full course of five years.

Significance
The starting point, in terms of legal analysis in this case, is the wording of the contract of
employment between the plaintiff and Zambia Railways. The relevant part of the contract is
provided under clause 3 of the contract of employment: “In the event of premature termination
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of the contract by the company on grounds other than disciplinary, the employee shall be
entitled to full payment of the amount due to him for the remaining part of the five-year
contract.”

Arising from this provision, the court concluded that since the contract provided for payment
of all dues in case of premature termination, apart from termination on disciplinary grounds,
the complainant was entitled to all the benefits as the contract provided.
Indeed, a casual look at the wording of the contract would suggest that the plaintiff was entitled
as per the contract terms. The general law of contract regarding contractual relations is well
stated in the case of Colgate Palmolive Inc v Able Shemu and 110 Others, in this case, the
courts stated that:

If there is one thing more than another which public policy requires it is that men of full age and
competent understanding shall have utmost liberty in contracting and that their contract when entered
into freely and voluntarily shall be enforced by courts of justice. 2

Courts observe and respect the sanctity of individual bargains and this is in recognition of the
fundamental principle of freedom to contract enjoyed by men of full age and competent
understanding. The courts have long regarded its role as one of, essentially, giving effect to the
true and honest intention and expectations of the parties to a bargain. This general principle
has, however, been modified when it comes to assessment of the quantum of damages in
contracts of employment. The Supreme Court in the case of National Airports Corporation
Limited v Reggie Ephraim Zimba and Saviour Konie, 3 was confronted with a case of
termination of a contract of employment whose wording is materially on all fours with
Professor Chirwa’s. The contract of employment in the case National Airport Corporation
provided for termination with three months notice by either party and went on to provide:

If the employer terminates the contract prematurely for reasons other than incompetence or willful
neglect of duty, all the benefits under the contract shall be paid as if the contract had run the full term.

2
3

SCZ Judgment No.11 of 2005
2000 ZR 154
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The Industrial and Labour Relations Court, having looked at the wording of the contract in
question, ordered that the damages for wrongful termination be computed as if the contract had
run its full term.

On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that damages for wrongful termination, where the contract
provided that damages would be paid as though the contract had run its full term, can only be
defended if the sum thereby stipulated can be held to be liquidated damage, that is to say, a
genuine pre-estimate of the damages the parties themselves intended should govern the contract
in the case of termination. The court further stated that the intention of the parties could not be
implemented by the court if the sum is held to be a penalty. The court characterized the
argument of Mr Mwanawasa, who argued that parties enter into contracts with their eyes wide
open, by stating that none of them should be heard to complain that the bargain is or has become
too onerous or unconscionable, as one which flew in the face of equitable intervention by the
courts, and which had become too entrenched to require or permit fresh debate. The court noted
that there are now rules or guidelines which have evolved over time and which can still be
further developed for distinguishing liquidated damages from penalties.
The Supreme Court cited the case of Mobil Oil Zambia Limited v Patel 4 with approval, whose
principle is to the effect that where the contract-breaker had a contractual option to terminate
the contract, the court should assess the damages on the footing that the party in breach would
have exercised the option. The Supreme Court thus held,
In this case, the damages should relate to the period of three months of salary and perquisites and any
other accrued benefits such as gratuity over that period. We find and hold the phrase invoked so as to
pay damages as if the contract had run its full course offends the rules which were first propounded as
propositions by Lord Dunedin, in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited v New Garage And Motor
Company Limited, especially that the resulting sum stipulated for is in effect bound to be extravagant
and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to
have followed from the breach.

The decision above handed down by the Supreme Court demonstrates that, in cases of breach
of a contract of employment, damages payable are distinguishable from those under the general
law of contract. This case gives critical guidelines which a court faced with the assessment of

4

1988 ZR 12
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damages in contracts of employment must invoke, especially for chief executives or very senior
positions whose contracts normally provide to the effect that in case of termination on grounds
other than incompetence, damages would be paid as though the contract had run its full term.
The binding principle as laid down by the Supreme Court, is that even where the contract
provides that damages are to be paid in case of termination as though the contract had run its
full term, the court would not implement such an intention as it is analogous to a penalty, that
it is to say, implementation of such an intention has the effect of penalizing the other party.
Instead, the court will order damages equivalent to what complaint would have been paid had
the notice period been given in accordance with the contract of employment. In other words, if
the contract provided for termination notice of three months, the court would order that
damages for wrongful termination be paid in reference to the period of notice regardless of
stipulations that benefits be paid as though the contract had run its full-term. The court arrived
at this position because there is no justification, whatsoever, for paying an employee full
benefits as if the contract has run its full term when he has only served a fraction of the term
as doing so would constitute unjust enrichment of an employee. Such a payment would be
gratuitous unsupported by consideration, and as such lacking legal basis.
Further, in the case of Zambia State Insurance and Attorney General v Allisand Singogo, 5 the
Supreme Court also considered the quantum of damages for breach of contract involving a
managing director and chief executive of Zambia State Insurance. The contract of employment
provided for notice period of three months in case of termination by either party or pay in lieu
of notice. The contract further stated, “the employee shall immediately be paid in full all
monetary benefits and be able to exercise the option to purchase any articles, items or such
related equipment the employee would have befitted if the contract had run its full-term.” The
court, in reversing the award of damages granted by the lower court, held that there was need
to exercise caution in deciding the measure of damages to avoid virtual reinstatement without
consideration and run away damages of “near vengeance”. The court reiterated the principle as
laid down in the Zimba and Konnie case (cited above) that where there is a breach of contract
of employment, and the party in breach had an option of terminating, the complainant would
be awarded damages equivalent to what he would have been paid had the notice period been
given regardless of the intention of the parties.

5

2007 SCZ (unreported)
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The jurisprudence in Zambia, therefore, with respect to damages for breach of contract of
employment, is that payment of benefits in terms of salaries and gratuity for the unexpired term
of the contract is highly untenable as it lacks consideration. Such a payment when effected
constitutes unjust enrichment. Paying an employee benefits for the unexpired term is also
regarded a penal act on the employer and as such frowned upon by the courts.

In view of the principles and authorities discussed, it becomes very clear that the High Court
erred in awarding Professor Chirwa damages for the unexpired period of the contract of
employment. The award is therefore unlawful as it offends the entrenched principles laid down
by the Supreme Court in awarding damages in contracts of employment. It must be stressed
categorically that there is no authority that supports the award of damages for the unexpired
period of the contract on account of special circumstances because such an award or awards
are regarded to be too extravagant and constitute what the Supreme Court referred to as “virtue
reinstatement without consideration” and run away damages of near vengeance. Put it
differently, such awards are avoided because they smack of unjust enrichment and are
analogous to penalizing the employer.

The correct position in the case at hand would have been to award damages to the plaintiff
commensurate to the notice period stipulated under the contract of employment. Gratuity and
other perquisites should have equally been paid on a prorated basis. The court also did not
consider the concept of mitigation of loss and in this particular case, the court should have paid
attention and ascertained whether the Plaintiff had prospects of finding alternative
employment. Taking this factor into account helps courts to avoid excessive awards of damages
in both employment and ordinary contracts.

Conclusion
This case is a stain on the stilts of clear and well-entrenched principles relating to awarding of
damages in employment contracts. The case departs radically from the consistent and
unwavering pronouncements by the Supreme of Zambia on the considerations a court should
take into account when faced with the determination of quantum of damages in employment.
In view of the fact that there has already been sound pronouncements on this matter by the
Supreme Court, the Chirwa case is of no jurisprudential value and may soon be consigned to
the dustbin of history.
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